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1. Introduction 
The Internet is the primary global network for digital communications.  A 
number of different services are provided on the Internet, including e-mail, browsing 
(using Internet Explorer, Firefox, Opera, or others), peer-to-peer services, Internet 
telephony (Voice over Internet Protocol “VOIP”), and many others.  A number of 
different functions/applications run on top of the Internet browser, including 
information services (Google, Yahoo, MSN), display of images, transmission of video 
and others.  Since the inception of the Internet, information packets are transported on 
the Internet under “net neutrality,” a regime that does not distinguish in terms of price 
between bits or packets depending on the services that these bits and packets are used 
for, and also does not distinguish in price based on the identities of the uploader and 
downloader. 
 
As video services and digital distribution of content over the Internet are 
growing, Internet broadband access providers AT&T, Verizon and a number of cable 
TV companies, have recently demanded additional compensation for carrying 
valuable digital services.  Ed Whitacre, AT&T’s CEO has been recently quoted in 
BusinessWeek referring to AT&T’s Internet infrastructure: “Now what they would 
like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have 
spent this capital and we have to have a return on it.” 1  Of course no one is using the 
Internet for free, since both sides of an Internet transfer pay.2  AT&T’s president, 
together with Verizon and cable TV companies, are asking for the abolition of “net 
neutrality.”  AT&T and Verizon and some cable companies would like to abolish the 
regime of net neutrality and substitute for it a pricing schedule where, besides the 
basic service for transmission of bits, there will be additional charges by the Internet 
operator for services applied to the originating party (such as Google, Yahoo, or 
MSN).  The access network operators also have reserved the right to charge 
differently based on the identity of the provider even for the same type of packets, for 
example charge more Google than Yahoo for the same transmission. 
 
In abolishing net neutrality, the telephone and cable companies are departing 
from the “end-to-end principle” that governed the Internet since its inception.  Under 
the end-to-end principle, computers attached to the Internet sending and receiving 
information packets did not need to know the structure of the network and could just 
interact end-to-end.  Thus there could be innovation “at the edge” of the network 
without interference from the network operators.3  The way the Internet has operated 
                                                 
1 Interview of Ed Whitacre, BusinessWeek November 7, 2005. 
Q. How concerned are you about Internet upstarts like Google (GOOG), MSN, Vonage, and others? 
A. How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies 
have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going 
to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it. So there’s 
going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion 
they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes?  
The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an 
investment and for a Google or Yahoo! (YHOO) or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these 
pipes [for] free is nuts! 
 
2 See Economides (2008). 
 
3 See Cerf (2006a, b) for a detailed explanation of this argument. 
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this far is a radical departure from the operating principles of traditional digital 
electronic networks that predated it, such as Compuserve, Prodigy, AOL, AT&T 
Mail, MCI Mail, and others.  These older electronic networks were centralized with 
very little functionality allowed at the edge of the network.   
 
From an economics point of view, the departure from net neutrality regulation 
will have six consequences.  First, it will introduce on the Internet two-sided pricing 
where a transmission company controlling some part of the Internet (here last mile 
access) will charge a fee to content or application firms “on other side” of the network 
which typically did not have a contractual relationship with it.  Second, it will 
introduce prioritization which may enhance the arrival time of information packets 
that originate from paying content and application firms “on the other side,” and may 
degrade the arrival time of information packets that originate from non-paying firms.  
In fact, the present plans of access providers are to create a “special lane” for the 
information packets of the paying firms while restricting the lane of the non-payers 
without expanding total capacity.  By manipulating the size of the paying firms’ lane, 
the access provider can guarantee a difference in the arrival rates of packets 
originating from paying and non-paying firms, even if the actual improvement in 
arrival time for paying firms’ packets is not improved over net neutrality.  Third, if 
the access providers choose to engage in identity-based discrimination, they can 
determine which one of the firms in an industry sector on the other side of the 
network, say in search, will get priority and therefore win.  This can easily be done by 
announcing that prioritization will be offered to only one of the search firms, for 
example the one that bids the highest.  Thus, the determination of the winner in search 
and other markets “on the other side” will be in hands of the access providers.  This 
can create very significant distortions since the surplus “on the other side” of the 
Internet is a large multiple of the combined telecom and cable TV revenue from 
residential Internet access.4  Fourth, new firms with small capitalization (or those 
innovative firms that have not yet achieved significant penetration and revenues) will 
very likely not be the winners of the prioritization auction.  This is likely to reduce 
innovation.  Fifth, the access networks can favor their own content and applications 
rather that those of independent firms.  Finally, since the Internet consists of a series 
of interconnected networks, any one of these networks, and not just the final 
consumer access ones, can, in principle, ask content and application providers for a 
fee.  This can result in multiple fees charged on a single transmission and lead to a 
significant reduction of trade on the Internet, 5 similar to the reduction of trade in 
medieval times when the weakening of the state power of the Roman Empire allowed 
multiple fees to be collected by many independent city powers along a trading route. 
 
In this paper, we deal primarily with the first issue in the previous paragraph 
                                                 
4 See Economides (2007) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
 
5 The imposition of multiple margins by independent producers of complementary goods was first 
discussed by Cournot (1838).  In Cournot’s setup, there are two complementary components that can 
be combined in fixed proportions to produce a composite good.  In the setup, each component is 
produced by a single firm, i.e., we have two independent monopolists.  In a second setup, both 
components are produced by the same firm (integrated monopoly).  He showed that the price of the 
composite good will be higher with independent monopolists than with integrated monopoly.  This is 
because each of the independent monopolists does not take fully into account the effect of his price 
increase on the market.  This has been called “double marginalization.” 
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by formally building a model of a two-sided market.  In terms of potential welfare 
reduction as a result of the departure from net neutrality, we model the first effect 
above which results has the least reduction in total surplus compared with net 
neutrality.  The second issue above, manipulation of the prioritized lanes and 
reduction of the “standard” lane is likely to result in further degradation of 
consumers’ surplus.  The third and fourth issues above are also likely to reduce 
surplus as the winners “on the other side” will be determined by the access networks 
and not by their innovative products or services.  Similarly, the fifth issue (network 
favoring own content) is likely to distort competition and reduce surplus.  The same is 
true for the sixth issue which can result in multiple fees on a transmission.  Even 
though we make the best possible case for total surplus to increase when departing 
from net neutrality (by not focusing on factors two to six that are likely to reduce 
surplus), we find that typically total surplus decreases, both in monopoly and duopoly 
when we depart from net neutrality. 
 
We explicitly model the Internet broadband market as a two-sided network 
consisting of broadband users on one side and content and applications providers on 
the other side.  Prices imposed on both sides have direct implications on the number 
of broadband consumers as well as on the number of active providers of content and 
applications.  We discuss the incentives of a monopoly broadband Internet access 
network, starting from net neutrality that is, starting from a zero fee to content 
providers to initiate a positive fee to the content and applications side of the market 
besides the price it charges to users/subscribers.  We show that while a monopoly 
broadband Internet access network has an incentive to charge a positive fee to content 
providers, typically an increase of such a fee above zero decreases total surplus.  It is 
in fact total surplus maximizing for the platform to subsidize content providers.  This 
is not surprising given the two-sided nature of the Internet market.  We further show 
that generally net neutrality increases total surplus compared to duopoly competition 
between platforms that would impose positive fees on content providers.  
 
Despite a considerable literature discussing the rights and legal issues of net 
neutrality and its abolition, the literature on economic analysis of this issue is thin.  In 
relation to the second issue above, the prioritization of information packets, two 
papers have emerged.  In a paper relating to the establishment of multiple “lanes” or 
quality options for application providers, Hermalin and Katz (2007) analyze a model 
where net neutrality is equivalent to a single product (quality) requirement.  The effect 
of restricting the product-line is that low valuation application providers get excluded, 
medium valuation providers purchase higher and more efficient qualities and high 
valuation application providers purchase lower valuation and less efficient qualities.  
The impact on total surplus is ambiguous, but the set of applications available is 
reduced.6  Focusing on congestion, Cheng, Bandyopadhyay and Guo (2007) model 
two content providers who can avoid congestion by paying ISPs for preferential 
access.  They find that abolishing net neutrality will benefit ISPs and hurt content 
providers.  Depending on parameter values, consumers are either unaffected or better 
off.  Social welfare increases when net neutrality is abandoned and one content 
provider pays for access, but remains unchanged when both content providers pay.  
The reason consumer surplus may increase is that it is always the more profitable 
                                                 
6 Hermalin and Katz (2007) do not address the issue of the reduction of the “standard” lane for Internet 
access that is likely to reduce consumers’ welfare. 
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content provider that pays for access, and hence gets preferential treatment.  This 
benefits consumers of the more profitable content provider because congestion is 
reduced.  Consumers of the less profitable content provider that does not pay for 
preferential access lose, since congestion costs increase.  They also find that 
incentives for the broadband provider to expand its capacity are higher under net 
neutrality regulation since more capacity leads to less congestion. Because congestion 
decreases, Internet services become more valuable (to the benefit of ISPs).  If net 
neutrality is abolished, their model predicts reduced investment incentives due to 
congestion becoming less of a problem.7
 
In contrast to the above literature, we focus on the issue of two-sided pricing 
made possible by the abolishment of net neutrality regulation.  Hence, our paper is 
closely related to the literature on two-sided markets, mainly Armstrong (2006).8  We 
have structured our paper in the following way.  We first present and evaluate the 
impact of net neutrality regulation in a monopoly model in section 2.  In section 3, we 
extend the monopoly model to a duopoly setting with multi-homing content providers. 
We conclude in section 4. 
 
2. Platform Monopoly 
We start with a platform monopoly model of a two-sided market.  A platform 
(say a telephone company, such as AT&T) sells broadband Internet access to 
consumers at a subscription price p  and possibly collects a fee s  from each content 
or application provider to allow the content to reach the consumer.  We assume that 
the platform monopolist (and later in the paper, duopolists) only offer linear fee 
contracts, i.e., they do not offer quantity discounts and do not offer take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts with lump sum fees.  We further abstract from the full complexity of the 
Internet, which consists of many interconnected networks, and assume that the 
                                                 
7 Additionally, Chen and Nalebuff (2007) analyze competition between complements and briefly touch 
upon the issue of net neutrality.  Some services that are offered by an ISP may also be offered over the 
Internet (such as Vonage or Skype).  There is a concern that the ISP would like to disrupt the quality of 
the services of its competitors to further its own product.  However, the authors show that this would 
not be profit maximizing in their model since a monopolist ISP benefits from valuable complements 
such as VOIP services (a higher price for internet access could be charged instead of trying to force 
consumers to its own VOIP service). Hogendorn (2007) analyze the differences between open access 
and net neutrality and emphasizes that they are different policies that may have different implications.  
Hogendorn interprets net neutrality in a slightly different way than what most of the literature has.  
Open access refers to allowing intermediaries access to conduits (so intermediaries such as Yahoo can 
access conduits such as AT&T at a nondiscriminatory price), while net neutrality is interpreted to mean 
that content providers have unrestricted access to intermediaries (so Yahoo can not restrict which 
content providers can be reached through its portal).  Under net neutrality, a smaller number of 
intermediaries enter the market due to decreased profits.  Open access on the other hand increases entry 
of intermediaries since they now have free access to conduits. In general, the author finds that open 
access is not a substitute for net neutrality regulation.  Finally, Economides (2008) discuss several 
possible price discrimination strategies that may become available if network neutrality is abolished. 
He presents a brief model, showing that total surplus may be lower when the platform imposes a 
positive fee on an application developed for it.  This is because the fee raises the marginal cost of the 
application and hence also its price. 
 
8 See also Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Hagiu (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). 
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networks that lie between the access provider and content provider are passive.9  
Finally, we assume that the cost of providing the platform service is  per consumer.  c
 
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are interested in accessing the Internet to reach search engines 
(e.g. Google), online stores (e.g. Amazon), online auctions (e.g. eBay) and online 
video, audio, still pictures, and other content.  Consumers are differentiated in their 
preferences for Internet access.  A consumer ’s location (type) i ix  indexes his/her 
preference for the Internet, so that consumers with a lower index place a higher value 
on the service. Consumers pay a transportation cost equal to  per unit of distance 
“traveled.”
t
10  We assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval 
 with the platform located at [0 1]x! " 0x # .  Consumer i ’s utility is specified as 
 
 i cp iu v bn tx p# $ % %  (1) 
 
where v  is an intrinsic value a consumer receives from connecting to the Internet 
irrespective of the amount of content,
c&
11 b  is the marginal value that a consumer 
places on an additional content provider on the Internet, and  is the number of 
content providers that are active. 
cpn
 
2.2 Content Providers
Content providers rely on advertising revenue per consumer, , to generate 
revenue.  We assume that content providers are uniformly distributed on the unit 
interval and have a unit mass.  We make the simplifying assumption that content 
providers are independent monopolists, each in its own market, and therefore do not 
compete with each other.  Each content provider then earns , where  is the 
number of consumers paying the platform for access to content providers.  Thus,  is 
the value to a content provider of an additional consumer connected to the Internet. 
a
can cn
a
 
Content providers are heterogeneous in terms of fixed costs of coming up with 
a business idea and setting up their business.  A content provider indexed by j  faces 
a fixed cost of jfy , where jy  is the index the content provider’s location on the unit 
interval.12  Marginal costs for serving advertisements to consumers are taken to be 
zero.  Each content provider may have to pay the platform a lump sum fee equal to s  
                                                 
9 As noted earlier, if the in-between networks also attempted to charge a fee to content providers, there 
is the possibility of high prices because of double or multiple marginalization. 
 
10 Assume that the market is not covered and demand is differentiable. 
 
11 Such benefit may arise from Internet-enabled services that do not crucially depend on the number of 
other Internet subscribers or availability of content.  An example may be television services bundled 
with Internet access. 
 
12 We assume that the “market is not covered” in the sense that some content providers will always 
have fixed costs so high that they decide not to enter the market. Further, we assume that demand for 
access to consumers is differentiable. 
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to gain access to users.  This fee is assumed to be the same for all content providers 
and it is set by the platform.  Thus, a content provider j ’s profit is13  
 
 j can s fy j' # % %  (2) 
As noted above, net neutrality regulation equals the case where s  is equal to zero.  
2.3 Demand
In this two-sided market, demand for content depends on the expected amount 
of content provided since more consumers will connect to the network if more 
expected content is available.  Additionally, the provision of content depends on 
expected the number of consumers.  That is, when the expected number of consumers 
is  and the expected number of content providers is , the marginal consumer, , 
indifferent between subscribing to the Internet and staying out is 
e
cn
e
cpn xi
 
 xi # nc #
v $ bncp
e % p
t
 (3) 
 
while the marginal content firm, , indifferent between being active and staying out 
of the market is 
yi
yi # ncp #
anc
e % s
f
.    (4) 
 
At fulfilled expectations equilibrium, each side of the market anticipates 
correctly its influence on the demand of the other side, and therefore and 
.  Thus, at fulfilled expectations, the number of consumers and active content 
providers is given by the solution to the simultaneous equation system (3) and (4) at 
fulfilled expectations which is  
e
cn n# c
e
cp cpn n#
 
( ) ( )( , ) and ( , )c cp
f v p bs a v p tsn p s n p s
ft ab ft ab
% % % %
#
% %
# .14  (5, 6) 
 
 
2.4 Monopoly Platform Optimum
Consider first the monopoly platform private optimum under which platform 
is free to set both subscription price p  and fee to content providers s .  The platform 
faces the problem of choosing p  and s  to maximize  
                                                 
j c c jan sn fy
13 Alternatively, one can specify the fee to the platform to be proportional to the number of platform 
customers,' # % % .  The qualitative results of our main specification go through in this 
alternative specification. 
 
14 We check later to ensure that under our assumptions nc ! 0,1( ) and ncp ! 0,1( )  at equilibrium. 
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( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )c cpp s p c n p s sn p s* # % $ .   (7) 
Because the two markets provide complementary products, the monopolist finds an 
inverse relationship between p  and s ; that is, maximizing with respect to p  results 
in a smaller p  when s  is larger, and maximizing with respect to s  results in a 
smaller s  when p  is larger.  Specifically, the optimal p  for the monopolist given s , 
defined by 0p+*+ # , is given by  
( ) ( )( )
2
f v c a b sp s
f
$ % $
# ,    (8) 
 
and the optimal s  for the monopolist given p , defined by 0s+*+ #  is 
( )( )
2
av bc a b ps p
t
$ % $
# .    (9) 
Solving the above two equations simultaneously gives the consumers’ 
subscription price and the fee charged to the content providers that maximize the 
platform’s profits:15,16
2 2
2 2
(2 )( ) ( ) ( )and 
4 ( ) 4 ( )
M Mft ab v c b c a v a b f v cp s
ft a b ft a b
% $ % % % %
#
% $ % $
# . (10, 11) 
The superscript “M” indicates the fully private optimum where both p  and s  are 
chosen by the monopoly platform.  The participation levels are: 
2 2
2 ( ) ( )( )and
4 ( ) 4 ( )
M M
c cp
f v c a b v cn n
ft a b ft a b
% $ %
# #
% $ % $
,17   (12) 
and the monopoly platform’s profits are 
2
2
( )
4 ( )
M f v c
ft a b
%
* #
% $
.      (13) 
                                                 
15 To satisfy the second order conditions, %
2 f
( ft % ab)
, 0  and 
2
2
4 ( )
0
( )
ft a b
ft ab
% $
&
%
, we assume 
, which implies . 24 ( )ft a b% $ & 0 0ft ab% &
 
16 Since 
2
2
( )(2 ) 0
4 ( )
M v c ft ab ap c
ft a b
% % %
% # &
% $
, the price consumers pay, , is above marginal cost if 
 and above 0 if 
pM
2 ft % a(a $ b) & 0 2 ft(v $ c) % (a $ b)(av $ bc) & 0 .  Although a negative price might 
not be implementable, the platform may tie other products with the offer for Internet access and thereby 
in effect achieve a negative price.  See Amelio and Jullien (2007). 
 
17 To ensure that the market is not covered on either side, we impose 
 and , i.e., that the differentiation 
parameters f and t, are sufficiently high. 
4 ft % (a $ b)2 % (a $ b)(v % c) & 0 4 ft % (a $ b)2 % 2 f (v % c) & 0
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The access platform benefits from additional content (since additional content 
increases the willingness to pay of its subscribers) but does not receive the full benefit 
of the content increase.  Therefore the platform cannot fully internalize the network 
effects of content and charges a positive price to content providers.  The platform 
service provider sets a positive fee to content providers for accessing users if .  
This means that, if content providers value additional consumers higher than 
consumers value additional content providers, the platform will charge content 
providers a positive price for accessing consumers.  One may argue that consumers 
have become more valuable to content providers lately, so that there are higher 
incentives for a platform, such as AT&T, to seek ways to be able to charge content 
providers for access to users.  In some other networks, for example, in the network of 
a game platform/console (such as the Sony PlayStation platform) and games 
(software), the platform similarly collects a fee from independent game developers. 
a b&
 
It is worth noting that in some two-sided markets, a firm on the other side of 
the market may value an additional platform consumer less than a platform consumer 
values an additional firm on the other side of the market, that is, a b, .  For example, 
a Windows application (not sold by Microsoft) may value less an additional Windows 
purchaser than this consumer values the existence of this additional application.   
When this is true, the platform will subsidize the firms on other side of the market to 
increase their number and more fully internalize the externality.  Thus, operating 
systems companies subsidize the developers of applications by embedding in the 
operating systems subroutines that are valuable to applications developers, but not 
directly valuable to users.18,19   
 
2.5 Monopoly Under Network Neutrality Regulation 
Consider the optimal choices of the monopoly platform provider under net 
neutrality regulation, that is, when by regulation 0s # .  The platform’s objective is 
now to maximize  
( )NN cp c n* # % ,    (14) 
which gives the equilibrium price 2
NN v cp $# .20  Equilibrium participation levels are 
                                                 
18 Also see Economides (2006), Economides and Katsamakas (2006a, b). 
 
19 Also note that in some two–sided markets the organizing networks have arbitrarily set the fee 
between different network firms without allowing the market to set a positive or negative fee across 
them according to specific circumstances.  This is the case in the Visa and MasterCard networks of 
acquiring and issuing banks.  These networks have set a fixed percentage fee between an acquiring and 
an issuing bank on the dollar value of transactions without regard to the specific market position of 
each pair of such banks.  See Economides (2007), Rochet and Tirole (2003). 
 
20 The second order condition 
 
%
2 f
ft % ab
, 0  is satisfied if ft % ab & 0 . In addition, we need to impose 
that 2( ft % ab) % f (v % c) & 0  and 2( ft % ab) % a(v % c) & 0  to ensure that the markets are not 
covered. 
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 ( ) ( )and
2( ) 2( )
NN NN
c cp
f v c a v cn n
ft ab ft ab
% %
# #
% %
,  (15, 16) 
and platform profits are  
2( )
4( )
NN f v c
ft ab
%
* #
%
.    (17) 
 
2.6 Social Optimum 
In this subsection, we solve for prices p  and s  that maximize total surplus 
defined as  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )c cpTS p s p s CS p s p s# * $ $* ,    (18) 
where ( , )p s*  are platform profits,  
( , )
0
( , ) ( ( , ) )
cn p s
c cpCS p s v bn p s tx p dx# $ % %-    (19) 
is consumer surplus and 
( , )
0
( ( , ) )
cpn p s
cp can s dy* # %- p s fy% ,     (20) 
is the sum of content providers’ profits. 
 
 Maximizing total surplus,21 a planner chooses  
*
2
( ) ( )
( )
ftc b a b c a a b vp c
ft a b
% $ % $
# ,
% $
 and * 2
( ) 0
( )
bf v cs
ft a b
%
# % ,
% $
.22,23    (21)  
                                                 
21 The second order conditions, 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft a ab
ft ab
% %
% ,
%
, 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft b ab
ft ab
% %
% ,
%
 and 
2
2
( )
0
( )
ft a b
ft ab
% $
&
%
, are satisfied if  2( )ft a b& $ , which we assume to be the case.  Further, we impose 
 and  to ensure that the market is not 
covered at optimum. 
ft % f (v % c) % (a $ b)2 & 0 ft % (a $ b)(v % c) % (a $ b)2 & 0
 
22 These inequalities are implied by v .   c&
 
23 In our case, with a , clearly b& * 0 Ms , , s .  But, even in industries where  and the 
platform monopolist subsidizes the other side of the market we have 
a b,
* 0Ms s, , , that is, the 
monopolist subsidizes the other side of the market less than the regulator would because the monopolist 
does not fully internalize the network externality from the availability of more complementary goods 
on  the other side of the market.   In general, the unregulated monopolist will impose a higher fee to the 
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 This results in maximized total surplus 
2
* *
2
( )( , )
2( ( ) )
f v cTS p s
ft a b
%
#
% $
.     (22) 
Proposition 1a:  A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in the two-
sided market with network effects chooses below-cost pricing in both markets. 
 
Proposition 1b:  A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in a two-sided 
market with network effects constrained to marginal cost pricing in the subscription 
market chooses below-cost pricing in the content market.24
 
Proposition 1c:  A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator in a two-sided 
market constrained to marginal cost pricing in the content market chooses below-cost 
pricing in the subscription market.25
 
Because of network effects arising from the complementarity of the content 
and Internet subscription market, to internalize the externality of content on 
subscribers and of subscribers to content, the planner sets a negative fee to content 
providers  and a subscription price below its marginal cost * 0s , *p c, . The fact that 
the planner subsidizes content providers suggests that net neutrality (where s  is set to 
                                                                                                                                            
* ,Ms s, 2( ) / ( 3 ) when fother side of the market than the regulated monopolists, t a a b a b& $ $ , 
that is, when there is sufficiently high differentiation among the consumers and the content firms. 
 
24 Choosing  s  to maximize   gives TS(c,s)
2
2
** ( )( ) 0
( 2 )
b a ft v c
s
t ft ab b
$ %
# % ,
% %
 since 2( )ft a b& $ .  The 
maximized surplus is  TS(c,s**) # ( ft $ a
2 )(c % v)2
2t( ft % 2ab % b2 )
.  The sufficient condition for a maximum is 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
t ft ab b
ft ab
% %
% ,
%
. 
25 Choosing   to maximize   gives p TS( p,0)
2
2
** ( )
2
vft ab c a abv
p c
ft ab a
%% %
# ,
% %
 since 2( )ft a b& $ .  The 
maximized surplus is TS(p**,0) # ft(c % v)
2
2( ft % a(a $ ab))
.  The sufficient condition for a maximum is 
2
2
( 2 )
0
( )
f ft ab a
ft ab
% %
% ,
%
.  Comparing    with TS  we have that TS(c,s
**) ( p**,0)
4 3 2 2
** **
2 2
( 2 )( )( , ) ( ,0) 0
2 ( 2 )(2 )
a a b b ft v cTS c s TS p
t a ab ft ab b ft
$ % %
% # % &
$ % $ %
ft & a
3
b2
  if (a $ 2b) .  The 
percentage gains in total surplus in our model when going from marginal cost pricing on one side of the 
market and optimality on the other to full optimality are TS( p
*,s*) % TS(c,s**)
TS( p*,s*)
#
a2(a $ b)2
ft( ft % 2ab% b2 )
& 0  
and 
 
TS( p*,s*) % TS( p**,0)
TS( p*,s*)
#
b2
ft % 2ab% a2
& 0.   The percentage gain in total surplus of optimality over 
net neutrality  is  
* * 4 3 2 2 2
* * 2
( , ) ( ,0) 2 (3 ) ( 2 )
( , ) 4( )
NNTS p s TS p a ab ft b ft a b ft
TS p s ft ab
% % $ $ $
#
%
$ . 
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zero) may also result in higher surplus than the private optimum.  The fact that  is 
negative does not prove net neutrality will achieve a higher surplus than the private 
optimum because  resulted from the unconstrained maximization of total surplus 
for a planner.  To see if net neutrality is better in terms of total surplus than the private 
optimum, we need to take into consideration the fact that the monopolist is 
maximizing profits by choosing price 
*s
*s
Mp , while  was calculated based on the 
planner choosing 
*s
*p .  Thus, we need to define total surplus under the maintained 
condition that, whatever the level of s , the monopolist chooses price p  to maximize 
its profits.  The planner then optimizes this constrained total surplus function, and 
considers if setting  (that is, imposing net neutrality) improves over the fully 
private solution.  This is done in the next section. 
0s #
 
2.7 Welfare Implications of Imposing Net Neutrality 
In this subsection we examine the welfare implications of imposing net 
neutrality in two ways.  First, starting with a regime of net neutrality, we examine the 
incentive of the platform to set a small positive fee to the content providers and the 
effects of such an action to total industry surplus. To assess these, we examine the 
incremental change in platform profits and total industry surplus as the fee charged to 
content providers increases from zero to a small positive value.  Of course, this is 
done under the maintained assumption that the monopoly platform chooses the 
subscription price ( )p s  to maximize its profits.  Second, we examine the changes in 
welfare that occur when moving from a privately optimal p , given , to the full 
private optimum (
0s #
Mp and Ms ). 
  
Thus, we first define total surplus under the restriction that the monopolist, 
given s, will set his optimal price for subscription ( )p s , as defined in equation (6a), 
that is, we define the constrained total surplus function . We then evaluate 
the derivatives of the monopolist’s profits and total surplus  with respect 
to the fee 
( ( ), )TS p s s
( ( ), )TS p s s
s  at 0.   
 
The monopolist’s incentive to increase the fee to content providers from zero 
to a small positive value is 
0
0 0
( ( ), ) ( )( ) ,
2( )
p
s s
d
d p s s a b v c
ds ds ft ab
+*
#
+
# #
*
* %
# #
%
%   (23) 
 
which is positive when . The incentive of a planner to increase the fee to the 
content providers from zero to a small positive value taking into account that the 
monopolist chooses subscription price 
a b&
( )p s  is 
2 20
0 0 2
( ( ), ) ( )( ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ) ,
4( )
p
s s
dTS
dTS p s s v c a a ab b a b ft
ds ds ft ab
+*
#
+
# #
% % $ $ %
# #
%
 (24) 
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which is negative provided that 3a b,  and ft  is sufficiently large, i.e., if the 
consumers and content providers are sufficiently differentiated.  We also require 
concavity of , for which it is sufficient that ( ( ), )TS p s s 2a b, .26  Thus, for  
and
2b a b, ,
ft  sufficiently large, starting from a zero fee under net neutrality, the incentives 
of the platform and society go in opposite directions: the monopolist’s incentive is for 
the platform to charge a positive fee to content providers, while the social incentive is 
for the platform to subsidize content providers.  It follows that net neutrality ( ) is 
better for society than the profit maximizing solution of the monopoly platform, 
which implies a positive fee to content providers ( ). 
0s #
0Ms &
 
Proposition 2a:  Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to 
content providers, a platform monopolist choosing optimally his subscription price 
would like to marginally increase the fee to content providers above zero. 
 
Proposition 2b:  Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to 
content providers and facing a platform monopolist that chooses the subscription 
price, a total surplus maximizing planner/regulator will choose to marginally 
decrease the fee to content providers below zero. 
 
We have shown that a regulator/planner setting a fee s  to content providers 
(expecting the platform monopolist to set his profit-maximizing subscription price 
( )p s ) will choose a negative fee s , i.e., will subsidize the content providers.  We 
now calculate this fee, and the subscription price***s *** ***( )p p s#  the monopolist 
chooses given this fee.  Maximizing the constrained total surplus function  
with respect to 
( ( ), )TS p s s
s we find  
s*** # % f (a(a
2 % ab $ 2b2 ) $ (a % 3b) ft)(c % v)
(a2 % 6ab % 3b2 ) ft $ 4 f 2t 2 % a(a % 2b)(a $ b)2  (25) 
 
and the corresponding monopolist’s subscription price  
 
p*** # a
2 (cft $ b2 (2c $ v)) $ a(2bft(2c $ v) % 2cb3 ) % a4v % ft(3b2c % 2 ft(c $ v))
(a2 % 6ab % 3b2 ) ft $ 4 f 2t 2 % a(a % 2b)(a $ b)2
.   (26) 
 
The fee  to content providers is negative provided that ***s 3a b,  and ft  is 
sufficiently large, which we have assumed earlier.27  Given that the  is negative, 
the platform profits from consumers cover the subsidy to content providers if: 
***s
 
                                                 
26 Note that 
2 2 2 2
2 2
( ( ), ) ( 2 )( ) ( 6 3 ) 4( )
0
4 ( )
d TS p s s a a b a b a ab b ft ft
ds f ft ab
% $ % % % %
# ,
%
2
 provided that a < 2b 
and ft sufficiently large. 
 
27  For  it is sufficient to have which is implied by  
and
*** 0s , a(a(a % b) $ 2b2 ) $ ft(a % 3b) , 0 3a b,
ft  sufficiently large. 
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(ft)2 (3a2 %10ab % 9b2 $ 4 ft) % a(a $ b)(a(a $ b)(a2 % 3ab $ 4b2 ) $ (a % 3b)(a $ 4b) ft) & 0
          (27)  
which is true for sufficiently large ft.28  Thus, the platform’s overall profits are 
positive even when, following the regulator’s orders, the platform provides subsidy 
 to the other side of the market. ***s%
  
Proposition 3:  A total surplus maximizing planner/regulator, facing a 
platform monopolist that chooses subscription price, will choose a below-cost fee to 
content providers, i.e., will subsidize content providers.  Even paying the below-cost 
fee, the platform makes positive profits.  
 
We can also explicitly compare prices, equilibrium participation levels, and 
surplus distribution across a setting where the platform is free to set both s  and p , 
and a setting of net neutrality regulation where s  is constrained to equal zero.  
Starting with net neutrality, consider the impact of removing net neutrality regulation 
i.e., compare results from above with the results from the privately optimal solution.  
In what follows, we also assume that a . The difference in equilibrium price to 
consumers and fee to content providers as we go away from net neutrality are  
b&
 
2
( )( )( ) 0,
2(4 ( ) )
M NN a b a b v cp p p
ft a b
% $ %
. # % # % ,
% $
   (28) 
 
2
( ) ( ) 0,
4 ( )
M NN M a b f v cs s s s
ft a b
% %
. # % # # &
% $
   (29) 
 
while the difference in equilibrium participation levels are  
 
2
2 1( )( )
4 ( ) 2( )
M NN
c c cn n n f v c ft a b ft ab
. # % # % % &
% $ %
0,   (30) 
 
2( )( )4 ( ) 2( )
M NN
cp cp cp
a b an n n v c
ft a b ft ab
0.$. # % # % % ,
% $ %
29    (31) 
 
The platform’s equilibrium profits are of course higher when it is unconstrained:  
2
2
1 1( ) ( )
4 ( ) 4( )
M NN f v c
ft a b ft ab
.* # * %* # % % &
% $ %
0.
                                                
 (32) 
Total consumer surplus and content provider profits are under private optimum 
 
0 )
28 The condition can be reformulated as 
4(ft)3+(3a2 %10ab % 9b2 )(ft)2 % a(a $ b)(a % 3b)(a $ 4b) ft % a(a $ b)a(a $ b)(a2 % 3ab $ 4b2 ) & 0
or  with A = 4 > 0. Hence, for ft  large enough the expression is 
positive. 
A(ft)3+B(ft)2 % C( ft) % D & 0
29 This is implied by 2 (  which is implied by )ft a a b% $ & 2(ft a b& $ that was assumed for the 
second order conditions of the unconstrained total surplus optimization. 
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2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 ( ) ( ) ( )and
(4 ( ) ) 2(4 ( ) )
M M
c cp
2f t v c a b f v cCS
ft a b ft a b
% $
# * #
% $ % $
%  (33, 34) 
and under net neutrality regulation 
2 2 2
2
( ) ( )and .
8( ) 8( )
NN NN
c cp
2
2
f t v c a f v cCS
ab ft ab ft
%
# * #
% %
%   (35, 36) 
The change in consumer surplus when net neutrality regulation is removed is then30  
 
2 2
2 2 2
1 16 1( ) ( )
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN
c c cCS CS CS f t v c ft a b ft ab
. # % # % % &
% $ %
0  (37) 
 
and the change in content provider surplus 
 
2 2
2
2 2 2
1 4( )( ) ( )
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN
cp cp cp
a b af v c
ft a b ft ab
$
.* # * %* # % % ,
% $ %
0. 31  (38) 
 
We now calculate the change in total surplus that occurs when net neutrality 
regulation is removed.  Total surplus under the private optimum is  
2 2
2 2
(12 ( ) )( )
2(4 ( ) )
M f ft a b v cTS
ft a b
% $ %
#
% $
   (39) 
and under net neutrality regulation is 
2 2
2
( ) ( 2 3 .
8( )
NN )f v c a ab ftTS
ft ab
% % $
#
%
   (40) 
The change in total surplus is then  
2 2
2 2 2
( ) 4(12 ( ) ) ( 2 3 ) 0,
8 (4 ( ) ) ( )
M NN f v c ft a b a ab ftTS TS TS
ft a b ft ab
/ 0% % $ % $
. # % # % ,1 2% $ %3 4
  (41) 
which is negative provided that 5a b,  and ft  is sufficiently large.32  Thus, removing 
                                                 
30 Note that 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
16 1 ( ) (4( ) (4 ( ) ))
0
(4 ( ) ) ( ) (4 ( ) ) ( )
a b ft ab ft a b
ft a b ft ab ft a b ft ab
% % $ % $
% #
% $ % % $ %
&
0
 since  
. 4 ft % (a $ b)2 & 0
 
31 This is implied by 2 (  which is implied by )ft a a b% $ & 2( )ft a b& $ that was assumed for the 
second order conditions of the unconstrained total surplus optimization. 
 
32 The expression for TS. is negative for large enough ft if  b < a < 5b  and 2ft - a(a+b)>0 since then 
the sign of the change in total surplus is equal to the sign of 
.   4(a % 5b)( ft)
2 $ b(a2 $ 23ab $ 3b2 ) ft % a(a $ b)2 (a2 $ ab $ 2b2 )
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net neutrality regulation decreases social welfare. 
 
 Proposition 4:  Comparing net neutrality and the monopolist platform’s 
choice, we find that total surplus is higher in net neutrality, the content sector has 
higher profits at net neutrality, and the platform and consumers are better off at 
monopoly. 
 
It is interesting that consumers’ surplus is higher at monopoly while total 
surplus is higher at net neutrality.  At monopoly, the consumers benefit from a lower 
subscription price since the monopolist has incentives to attract more consumers to 
generate extra revenue from charging content providers.  Although charging content 
providers leads to lower content provision, the direct effects of a lower subscription 
price dominates.  In contrast, total surplus takes into account the profits of content 
providers which are significantly higher under net neutrality.  Thus, despite 
consumers’ surplus being lower at net neutrality, total surplus is higher. 
 
2.8 Summary of Results for Platform Monopolist
We have showed that for a wide range of parameter values, the private and 
social incentives to set a positive fee to content providers diverge.  A private 
monopolist has an incentive to set a positive fee, while a social planner prefers a 
negative fee.  Additionally, implementing net neutrality regulation is beneficial for 
total welfare.  We have also compared a privately optimal solution where the 
monopolist is free to set price to consumers and content providers to the outcome 
where a zero fee to content providers is imposed.  The comparison showed that 
removing net neutrality regulation will lead to an increase in the fee content providers 
must pay for access and hence less content provided.  The price consumers pay for 
Internet access decreases, so more consumers purchase Internet access, but they have 
access to less content.  In the aggregate, consumers and the platform are better off and 
content providers worse off.  However, total welfare is reduced, so net neutrality 
regulation is beneficial for society. 
 
3. Duopoly Platforms with Multi-homing Content Providers 
We now extend our model to duopoly competition between two platforms 
with multi-homing content providers. We assume that consumers single-home, that is 
each consumer buys Internet access from one platform only.  Content and applications 
providers, however, are assumed to multi-home, i.e., they sell through both platforms, 
paying the fees charged by platforms.  As in monopoly, we assume that platforms 
offer only linear subscription prices and content provider fees. 
  
Content providers value consumers to the extent that they are willing to pay 
both platforms to reach all consumers instead of only paying one platform and 
reaching a subset of the consumers (only the consumers subscribing to that platform).  
                                                                                                                                            
 
ft &
5a3 $ a2b $ 23ab2 $ 3b2 $ A
This expression is then negative for 
8(5b % a)
, where 
.  A # (a % b)(25a
5 $ 67a4b $ 236a3b2 % 74a2b3 $ 13ab4 % 9b5
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In other words, each (atomistic) content provider decides to join each platform 
independently of joining the other.  
 
3.1 Consumers 
There are two platforms (1 and 2) located at 0x #  and 1x # .  We assume that 
each platform offers the same intrinsic benefit  v  to consumers.  Given an expected 
number of content providers  in each platform , ecpkn k {1,2}k ! , the marginal 
consumer, indifferent between buying from platform 1 or 2, is located at ix  that obeys  
 
1 1 2 (1 ) .
e e
cp i cp iv bn tx p v bn t x p$ % % # $ % % % 2    (42) 
 
Assuming full market coverage,33 sales of the two platforms are 
 
2 1 2 1
1 2
( ) ( )1 and 1
2 2
e e
cp cp
c c
b n n p p
n n
t
% % %
# % # % 1cn .  (43, 44) 
 
3.2 Content Providers 
Content providers are defined as in the monopoly model above, that is, they 
are heterogeneous with respect to fixed costs of setting up shop.  The expected 
number of consumers able to reach each content provider is , if the content 
provider buys access from platform , 
e
ckn
k {1,2}k ! .  Total revenue for each content 
provider is . eckan
Platform  collects a fee  from each content provider to allow access to its 
users.  Thus, a content provider j’s profit from selling through platform  is 
k ks
k
 
.ejk ck kan s fy' # % % j     (45) 
 
Each content provider with 0jk' 5  sets up its business, pays platform  for 
access to its consumers and makes non-negative profits from sales to those 
consumers.  Thus, the marginal content firm indifferent between being active and 
staying out of the market is  
k
 
,
e
ck k
cpk
an sn
f
%
# {1, 2}k !    (46, 47) 
 
Since consumers single-home, content providers can only reach each platform’s 
consumers by buying access from that platform.34
                                                 
33 We get very similar results when the market is not fully covered.  See a more detailed discussion in 
the Appendix. 
 
34 A “competitive bottleneck” arises as there is no competition for content providers due to the fact that 
they make a decision to join one platform independent of the decision to join the other.  This 
phenomenon is common in, for example, competing mobile telecommunications networks (receivers 
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 3.3 Demand 
At the fulfilled expectations equilibrium, each side of the market anticipates 
correctly its influence on the demand of the other side and therefore  and 
, .  Thus, at fulfilled expectations, the number of consumers and 
active content providers is given by the solution to the simultaneous equation system 
of (30a,b) and (32a,b) which is  
e
ck ckn n#
e
cpk cpkn n# {1,2}k !
 
2 1 2 1
1
( ) (1
2 2( )c
b s s f p pn
ft ab
% $ %
# $
%
)  and 2 1 2 12
( ) (1 ,
2 2( )c
b s s f p pn
ft ab
)% $ %
# %
%
  (48, 49) 
 
 
ncp1 #
a(b(s1 $ s2 ) $ f (t $ p2 % p1)) % (a
2b$ 2 fts1)
2 f ( ft % ab)
 and  (50) 
 
2
1 2 1 2 2
2
( ( ) ( )) ( 2 )
2 ( )cp
a b s s f t p p a b ftsn
f ft ab
$ $ $ % % $
#
%
.  (51) 
 
3.4 Unrestricted Duopoly Equilibrium 
When the duopoly platforms are free to set prices to both consumers and 
content providers, platform k maximizes 
 
1 2 1 2( , , , ) ( ) ,k k ck k cpkp p s s p c n s n* # % $   (52, 52) 
 
k = 1, 2, resulting in equilibrium prices 
 
2
1 2 1 2
3 and .
4 4
D D D Da ab a bp p t c s s
f
$ %
# # $ % # # 35,36 (54, 55) 
 
The firms split the market on the consumer side and profits are  
 
                                                                                                                                            
join one network but callers may call to all networks) and newspapers (a consumer may subscribe to 
only one newspaper but advertisers may advertise in all newspapers).  See Armstrong (2006). 
 
35 The second order conditions are %
f
ft % ab
, 0 ,  %
(2 ft % ab)
f ( ft % ab)
, 0  and 
(4 ft % (a $ b)2 ) $ 4( ft % ab)
4(ab % ft )2
& 0  and are satisfied since we have assumed . 4 ft % (a $ b)2 & 0
 
36 Note that equilibrium platform prices given 1s  and 2s  are 
 
1 2
1 1 2
3 (2 ) ( )( , )
3
ab a b s a b sp s s t c
f
/ 0$ $ $ %
# $ %1 2
3 4
, 2 1
2 1 2
3 (2 ) ( )( , )
3
ab a b s a b sp s s t c
f
/ 0$ $ $ %
# $ % 1 2
3 4
. 
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21 2
4 ( ) 4( ) .
16
D D ft a b ft ab
f
% $ $ %
* # * #   (56, 57) 
 
3.5 Duopoly Under Network Neutrality Regulation 
Under net neutrality regulation, 1 2 0s s# # , and the duopolists set 
independently their prices to consumers to maximize 
  
1 1( ) c1p c n* # %  and  2 2( ) c2p c n* # %     (58) 
 
with respect to 1p  and 2p  respectively, resulting in equilibrium prices of 
1 2 .
DNN DNN abp p t c
f
# # $ % 37    (59) 
The firms split the market equally on the consumer side and their profits are 
 
1 2
1 (
2
DNN DNN abt )
f
* #* # % .    (60) 
 
3.6 Welfare Implications of Imposing Network Neutrality in Duopoly 
In this section we proceed as in monopoly by first looking at incentives to set 
a positive fee to content providers and then making point-to-point comparisons 
between the duopoly equilibrium outcome under net neutrality regulation 
( ) and under no regulation. 1 2 0s s# #
We start by comparing the private and social incentives to set a positive fee to 
content providers.  The individual incentive for a platform (either 1 or 2) to increase 
its fee to content providers from zero to a small positive value when the opponent is 
charging a zero fee is 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 0
1 1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0
1 1
( ( , ), ( , ))p p
s s s s
d
d p s s p s s
ds ds
+* +*
# #
+ +
# # # #
*
*
# #
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
2 0
2 1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0
2 2
( ( , ), ( , )) 0
3
p p
s s s s
d
d p s s p s s a b
ds ds f
+* +*
# #
+ +
# # # #
*
* %
# # &
                                                
 (61) 
 
We define total surplus (TS ) as consisting of consumer surplus 
 
 
37 The second order condition, %
f
ft % ab
, 0 , is satisfied since we have assumed 
throughout . ft % ab & 0
 20
1c1
1
1 1 2 2
0 n
( ) ( (1 )
cn
cp cpCS v bn tx p dx v bn t x p dx# $ % % $ $ % % %- - ) ,
( ) c cp
  (62) 
the sum of platform profits, 
 
1 1 1 1 1 ,p c n s n# % $ 2 2 2 2 2( ) c cp  p c n s n** # % $
) .
   (63, 64) 
 
and total content provider profits 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2
0 0
( ) (
cp cpn n
cp c can s fy dy an s fy dy* # % % $ % %- -    (65) 
 
Starting with a regime of net neutrality, we examine the incentive of each 
duopolist to set a small positive fee to content providers and the effects of such an 
action to total industry surplus.  To assess these, we examine the incremental change 
in a duopolist’s profits and in total industry surplus as the fee charged by this 
duopolist to content providers increases from zero to a small positive value.  Of 
course, the total surplus comparison is done under the maintained assumption that the 
duopolists choose their equilibrium subscription prices 1 1 2 2 1 2( , ), ( , )p s s p s s .  The 
derivatives of constrained total surplus  with respect to 
the fees  and  respectively, evaluated at 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ), , )TS p s s p s s s s
1s 2s 1 2 0s s# # are
38
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
0
1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0
1 1
( ( , ), ( , ))p p
s s s s
dTS
dTS p s s p s s
ds ds
+* +*
# #
+ +
# # # ## #  
1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
0
1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0
2 2
( ( , ), ( , )) 0.
2
p p
s s s s
dTS
dTS p s s p s s b
s ds
+* +*
# #
+ +
# # # # f
# # % ,
+
 (66) 
 
Hence, as in monopoly, in duopoly, if , social and private incentives are in 
opposite directions.  Social incentives are to reduce the fees to content providers 
below zero, while each duopolist has an incentive to increase its fee to content 
providers above zero if the rival has a zero fee.  Therefore net neutrality is desirable 
from social perspective but undesirable for each duopolist. 
a b&
 
Proposition 5a:  Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to 
content providers by platform duopolists, each duopolist would like to marginally 
increase its fee to content providers above zero. 
 
Proposition 5b:  Starting from the net neutrality regime of a zero fee to 
content providers and facing platform duopolists that choose subscription prices non-
                                                 
38 The constrained total surplus function TS  is concave under the 
assumptions a  and 
.  In addition to ensure that the market is not 
covered on the content providers side we assume that 
(p1(s1, s2 ), p2 (s1, s2 ), s1, s2 )
4 $ ft(5b2 % 18 ft ) % ab2 (15a $ 4b) % a(a % 32b) ft , 0
a 4 % 2ab2 (3a $ 2b) % (a2 % 14ab % 5b2 ) ft % 9 f 2t 2 , 0
a $ b % 2 f & 0 . 
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cooperatively, a total surplus maximizing planner will choose to marginally decrease 
the fee to content providers below zero. 
 
 A planner, anticipating the duopolists subscription equilibrium prices, chooses 
negative fees to content providers, s1 # s2 # %
b
2
, 0 , to maximize the constrained total 
surplus function .  Imposition of these fees results in 
duopoly equilibrium subscription prices 
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2( ( , ), ( , ), , )TS p s s p s s s s
p1 # p2 # t $ c %
ab
2 f
.  Even paying the 
subsidy to content providers, the profits of the duopoly platforms are positive at the 
resulting equilibrium,
2
1 2
2 (2 ) 0
4
ft ab b
f
% $
* # * # & . 
 
 Proposition 6:  A total surplus maximizing planner, facing platform duopolists 
that choose their subscription prices based on the planner’s choice of a fee to content 
providers, will choose a below-cost fee to content providers. Even paying the below-
cost fee, the duopolists make positive profits. 
 
 We now consider the incentives of a duopolist to increase its fee to content 
providers given a possibly positive fee by its competitor.  We evaluate 
1 2
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and therefore,  
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Thus, for a > b, platform 1 has a lower incentive to set a positive fee to content 
providers if platform 2 quotes a positive fee to content providers.  Imposing net 
neutrality on platform 1’s competitor will strengthen platform 1’s incentives to 
increase the fee to content providers.  Thus, the incentive of a duopolist to depart from 
net neutrality is higher when the opponent observes net neutrality and not when the 
opponent charges a positive fee to content providers.  Conversely, an action by 
duopolists to depart simultaneously from net neutrality is not supported by individual 
non-cooperative incentives and therefore if it occurs, it arouses the suspicion of 
collusion on the content side of the market.  We discuss collusion in one side of the 
market with competition on the other side of the market in the next section. 
 
Proposition 7:  The incentive of a duopolist to increase its fee to content 
providers above zero decreases as the rival duopolist charges a higher fee. 
 
 We now do a point-to-point comparison between unconstrained duopoly and 
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the market equilibrium under net neutrality.  As in the monopoly model, we compare 
changes in price to consumers and fees to content providers when moving from a 
regime with net neutrality to a regime of no regulation.  Since the market is covered in 
both regimes, consumer participation does not change.  The differences in equilibrium 
prices to consumers and fees to content providers are 
1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) 0
4
D DNN D DNN a a bp p p p p p
f
%
. # % # . # % # % , , (69) 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 04
D DNN D DNN D D a bs s s s s s s s %. # % # . # % # # # & , (70) 
and the difference in content provider participation is 
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The differences in consumer surplus, platform profits and content provider 
profits are  
2( ) 0,
16
D DNN a bCS CS CS
f
%
. # % # &     (72) 
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and  
( )(3 ) 0
16
D DNN
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a b a b
f
% $
.* # * %* # % , .   (74) 
 
Total welfare is reduced when net neutrality regulation is removed since 
 
( )(3 ) 0.
16
D DNN a b a bTS TS TS
f
% $
. # % # % ,     (75) 
 
Thus, under no regulation, competition for consumers is more intense since 
profits from content providers can be competed away.  As a result, consumers enjoy 
lower prices and are better off under no regulation than under net neutrality.  Net 
neutrality regulation relaxes price competition, leading to higher profits for platforms. 
Platforms are better off under net neutrality, which is the opposite to what 
was the case in the monopoly model.39
 
 Proposition 8:  Comparing unconstrained duopoly with duopoly under net 
neutrality, we find that total surplus is higher in net neutrality and the content sector 
and the platforms have higher profits. The consumers are worse off under net 
neutrality. 
 
 
                                                 
39 The result that platforms are better off under net neutrality is partly due to the simplifying 
assumption that the market is always covered on the consumer side.  We show in the appendix that 
relaxing this assumption and allowing the market for subscription to the Internet not to be fully covered 
at equilibrium leads to the conclusion that platforms are worse off under net neutrality regulation. 
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3.7 Collusion on Fees to Content Providers 
As we have shown, duopolist platforms like the net neutrality regime because 
it allows them to charge higher subscription prices.  However, the individual incentive 
of each firm is to increase its fee to content providers and depart from net neutrality 
provided that the opponent stays at net neutrality.  Therefore, in a two-strategies game 
where each duopolist can set 0DNNis #  or the non-cooperative equilibrium fee 
D
is , 
both firms choose Dis  leading to a prisoners’ dilemma equilibrium with lower profits 
for both platforms than when both play 0DNNis # .  We show below that collusion 
between the platforms will also result in zero fees to content providers if the platforms 
are constrained to choose non-negative fees. 
Suppose that the duopolists first collude on fees to content providers, i.e., set 
cooperatively   and   to maximize joint profits * , and then set subscription 
fees non-cooperatively.
s1 s2 1 $*2
40  Given subscription fees  and s , the non-cooperative 
equilibrium subscription prices are 
s1 2
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Substituting these in joint profits * and maximizing with respect to   and 
we find that the joint profit maximizing fee for the platforms is zero:  
.  Therefore, the firms cannot improve over net neutrality if 
they collude.  
1 $*2 s1
 s2
1 2 0
DCO DCO DCOs s s# # #
 
Proposition 9:  Duopolists colluding in setting fees to content providers while 
competing non-cooperatively in subscription prices will choose zero fees if they are 
constrained not to choose non-negative fees.  Thus, the duopolists cannot improve 
over net neutrality by cooperating in linear fees to content providers. 
 
3.7 Summary of Results for Platform Duopoly
Extending the monopoly model to a duopoly setup, we showed that most of 
our results are robust to the introduction of competition between platforms.41   In 
platform duopoly, we find that for a wide range of parameter values, the private and 
social incentives to set a positive fee to content providers diverge.  A social planner 
would prefer a negative fee, while competing duopolists would like to choose a 
positive fee.  Hence, net neutrality regulation is beneficial for social welfare even 
when some competition is present in the platform market.  Comparisons between 
                                                 
40 Consumers and content providers form expectations and make their decisions subsequently. 
 
41 This echoes earlier theoretical evidence suggesting that introducing competition in a two-sided 
market does not necessarily lead to a pricing structure that is closer to the socially optimal one.  See, 
for example, Wright (2004) and Armstrong (2006).  
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outcomes under the private equilibrium with two-sided pricing and the private 
equilibrium under net neutrality regulation indicated that a removal of net neutrality 
regulation would lead to lower subscription price for consumers, but less content 
available due to an increase in fees to content providers.  Content providers are worse 
off, but consumers better off in the aggregate.  Social welfare is reduced supporting 
the result that net neutrality regulation is good for total welfare. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We developed a model of a two-sided market to assess the potential benefits 
of the Internet departing from “net neutrality” whereby broadband Internet access 
providers (telephone and cable TV companies) do not charge a positive fee to content 
and applications providers.  We explicitly allowed monopoly and duopoly access 
providers to charge a positive fee to content and applications providers.  We 
contrasted this with a setup where a regulator chooses the fee to content providers to 
maximize total surplus taking into account the pricing of a monopolist or duopolists in 
the consumer subscription side of the market.  We showed that, under these 
conditions, the regulator will choose a negative fee to content providers while a 
monopolist or duopolists choose positive fees.  We also showed that society is better 
off in terms of total surplus at net neutrality rather than either the monopolist’s or 
duopolists’ choices of positive fees to content providers.  
 
As noted in the introduction, the economics literature on net neutrality 
regulation is still in early stages.  Further rigorous economic analysis is needed on 
issues such as the impact of net neutrality regulation on innovation among content 
providers, on non-linear platform pricing to content providers, and on congestion and 
broadband penetration are important aspects that require further study.  We believe 
that it is important for future studies to account for the two-sided nature of the market.  
One-sided analysis of two-sided markets may easily lead to incorrect conclusions.42  
 
 
                                                 
42 See Wright (2004). 
 25
5. References 
 
Amelio, A. and Bruno Jullien (2007) “Tying and Freebies in Two-sided Markets,” 
mimeo., available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2007/tying.pdf . 
 
Armstrong, Mark (2006), “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” RAND Journal of  
Economics, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 668-691. 
 
Beard, Randolph T., George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky, and Lawrence J. Spiwak 
(2007), “Network Neutrality and Industry Structure,” Hastings 
Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, vol. 29, p. 149. 
 
Caillaud, B. and Bruno Jullien (2003), “Chicken & Egg: Competition Among 
Intermediation Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 24, pp. 
309–328.  
 
Cerf, Vinton G. (2006a), Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.  Hearing on “Network 
Neutrality,” February 7, 2006. 
 
Cerf, Vinton G. (2006b), Prepared Statement of Vinton G. Cerf, U.S. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary.  Hearing on Reconsidering our Communications 
Laws, June 14, 2006. 
 
Chen, M. Keith and Barry Nalebuff (2007), ‘One-Way Essential Complements’, 
mimeo., Yale University (April). 
 
Cheng, Hsing Kenneth, Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay and Hong Guo (2007), “The 
Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective,” mimeo. 
 
Choi, Jay Pil (2006), “Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Multi-Homing,”  NET 
Institute Working Paper #06-04,. 
 
Cournot, Augustin (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiques de la Theorie 
des Richesses, Paris: Hachette. 
 
Economides, Nicholas (2007),“Nonbanks in the Payments System: Vertical 
Integration Issues,” NET Institute Working Paper #07-06 (August 2007), at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Nonbanks_Payments_System.p
df . 
 
Economides, Nicholas (2008), “‘Net Neutrality,’ Non-Discrimination and Digital 
Distribution of Content Through the Internet,” forthcoming I/S: A Journal of 
Law and Policy for the Information Society.  Pre-publication electronic copy at 
www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Net_Neutrality.pdf. 
 
Economides, Nicholas and Evangelos Katsamakas (2006a),“Two-sided Competition 
of Proprietary vs. Open Source Technology Platforms and the Implications for 
the Software Industry,” Management Science, vol. 52, no. 7, pp. 1057-1071 
(July 2006).  Pre-publication electronic copy available at 
 26
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Katsamakas_Two-sided.pdf. 
 
Economides, Nicholas and Evangelos Katsamakas (2006b), “Linux vs. Windows: A 
Comparison of Application and Platform Innovation Incentives for Open 
Source and Proprietary Software Platform,” in Jürgen Bitzer and Philipp J.H. 
Schröder (eds.) The Economics of Open Source Software Development, 
Elsevier Publishers, 2006.  Pre-publication copy at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Katsamakas_Linux_vs._Win
dows.pdf. 
 
Ganley, Paul and Allgroue, Ben (2006), “Regulating the Internet: Net Neutrality: A 
User’s Guide,” Computer Law & Security Report vol. 22, pp. 454-463. 
 
Goolsbee, Austan (2006), “The Value of Broadband and the Deadweight Loss of 
Taxing New Technology,” Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy, 
vol. 5, no. 1. 
 
Hahn, Robert W. and Robert E. Litan (2006), “The Myth of Network Neutrality and 
What We Should Do About It,” mimeo. 
 
Hagiu, Andrei (2006), “Product Variety and Two-Sided Platform Pricing,” mimeo. 
 
Hermalin, Benjamin E. and Michael L. Katz (2007), “The Economics of Product-Line 
Restrictions with an application to the Network Neutrality Debate”, mimeo. 
UC Berkeley. 
 
Hogendorn, Christiaan (2006), “Broadband Internet: Net Neutrality versus Open 
Access,” mimeo. 
 
H. R. 5273, “Network Neutrality Act of 2006,” 109th Congress, 2d Session, proposed 
bill by Rep. Markey 
 
Peha, Jon M. (2006), “The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and 
the Quest for a Balanced Policy,” mimeo. 
 
Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J. (2003), “Platform competition in two-sided markets,” 
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 990–1029.  
 
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Tirole, Jean (2006), “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress 
Report,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, no. 3, pp 645-667. 
 
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole (2003), “An Economic Analysis of the 
Determination of Interchange Fees in Payment Card Systems,” Review of 
Network Economics, vol. 2, no. 2, June 2003. 
 
van Schewick, Barbara (2006),“Towards an Economic Framework for Network 
Neutrality Regulation,” Working Paper. 
 
Whitt, Richard S. (2004), “A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating A New 
Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers 
Model,” Federal Communications Law Journal, vol. 56, pp. 587 (May, 2004). 
 
 27
Wright, Julian (2004), “One-Sided Logic in Two-Sided Markets,” Review of Network 
Economics, vol.3, no. 1, pp. 44-64. 
 
Wu, Tim (2005), “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination,” Journal of 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law, vol. 2, pp. 141.  
 
Wu, Tim (2006), “Testimony of Tim Wu,” House Committee on the Judiciary 
Telecom & Antitrust Task Force, Hearing on “Network Neutrality: 
Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access.” 
 
Yoo, Christopher S. (2007), “What Can Antitrust Contribute to the Network 
Neutrality Debate?” mimeo. 
 
Zittrain, Jonathan (2006) “The Generative Internet” Harvard Law Review, 119, 1974.
 28
 6. Appendix 
Duopoly Model with Demand Expansion Effects on the Consumer Side 
 
Here we consider the model of duopoly under the assumption that the market 
on the consumers side is not covered, i.e., we account for demand expansion effects 
on the consumers side as we already do on the content provider side.  We show that 
our main conclusions do not change under this scenario. 
 
In contrast to the duopoly model presented above where the platforms where 
located at the end points of the unit interval over which consumers are uniformly 
distributed, we here locate the platforms at a distance d ,
1
2
 from the endpoints.  We 
assume that  and  are large enough so that the market is never covered and that the 
platforms compete for consumers located between them.  Hence, there will be 3 
marginal consumers denoted ,  and .  The consumer located at  is 
indifferent between buying from platform 1 and staying out of the market.  The 
consumer located at  is indifferent between the two platforms and the consumer 
located at  is indifferent between staying out of the market and buying from 
platform 2.  Given our utility specification, the locations of these indifferent 
consumers are given by 
d t
x1 x2 x3 x1
x2
x3
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2
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b(ncp2
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x3 # (1% d)$
v $ bncp2
e % p2
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and demand on the consumer side is nc1 # x2 % x1  and nc2 # x3 % x2 . The content 
provider side remains the same as in section 3.  
 
 At the fulfilled expectations equilibrium we can obtain expressions for the 
number of active consumers and content providers as functions of all four prices. 
These are 
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 Consumer surplus is  
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and content provider surplus is 
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Total surplus is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, platform profits and content 
provider profits. 
 
We first solve for equilibrium prices and fees in the unrestricted duopoly 
equilibrium.  Platform k choose prices and fees to maximize 
 
 
*k ( p1, p2 ,s1,s2 ) # ( pk % c)nck ( p1, p2 ,s1,s2 ) $ sk ncpk ( p1, p2 ,s1,s2 )  
 
resulting in symmetric equilibrium prices of 
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.43
 
Under net neutrality regulation ( s1 # s2 # 0 ), equilibrium subscription prices 
are obtained by each platform setting price to maximize 
 
 *k ( p1, p2 ,0,0) # ( pk % c)nck ( p1, p2 ,0,0)  
 
resulting in a symmetric subscription prices of 
 
                                                 
43 The second order conditions are 
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large enough. 
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We now compare the unconstrained duopoly and the market equilibrium under 
net neutrality.  Through rather tedious calculations, one can show that for a 
sufficiently large transportation cost parameter, the differences in equilibrium prices 
to consumers and fees to content providers are 
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and the differences in consumer and content provider participation are 
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The differences in consumer surplus, platform profits and content provider profits are  
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Under no regulation, competition for consumers is more intense since profits 
from content providers can be competed away.  As a result, consumers enjoy lower 
prices and are better off under no regulation than under net neutrality.  Platforms are 
also better off under no regulation.  This is the opposite result to that of the case when 
the market was covered.  This is the case because of profits from more consumers 
entering the market.  Content providers are worse off, and total welfare is reduced. 
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